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HOOK, LINE AND SINKER
(AND FISHING PERMITS, TOO?):
THE INCLUSION OF FISHING PERMITS AS
APPURTENANCES TO MARITIME LIENS
Charles W. Olcott*
I. INTRODUCTION
Fishermen going out to the Northeast's famed fishing grounds over the
last several years have been pulling in large catches of once-ailing
groundfish after more than a decade of decline.' Many fishermen, and even
scientists and fishery managers, say that there are more fish in the ocean
now than at any other point in recent memory.2 However, despite the
plentiful landings, total landings are down in some ports from years past
due to stiff regulations that strictly curtail the areas that can be fished and
the total number of days that a fisherman can be at sea. This regulatory
framework was put in place in an effort to limit the number of fish caught
to a more sustainable level." Indeed, the increased landings that individual
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2003.
1. John Richardson, The Fate of Fishing: Families Who Know No Other Way of Life
Brace For Big Change; New England's Groundflshing Crisis Has Culminated in Historic
Court-Ordered Limitations, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, May 5, 2002, at IA. Richardson
reports that between 1991 and 1998, Maine's groundfishing landings experienced a 53%
decline. Id.
2. Meredith Goad, CHANGING HANDS IN CHANGING TIMES: Fishing fora Living;
As the Rachel TPasses From One Seafaring Family to Another, Their Stories Illustrate the
Decisions, Despair, Hardships and Hopes in Keeping Careers Afloat in the Tempestuous
Summer of 2002, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Sept. 1. 2002, at IA [hereinafter Goad].
3. John Richardson, Business Mix Keeps Port Robust; Cargo Traffic and Industrial
Activity in Portland Harbor Rose in 2002, Offsetting Other Declines, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Jan. 14,2003, at IA.
4. See Conservation Law Foundation v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2001). In that
Order, Judge Kessler makes it clear that although landings in some fisheries are on the rise,
the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) efforts have failed to comply with federal
law demanding that fisheries be brought to sustainable levels.
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fishing boats are realizing indicate that the framework appears to be
working, at least to a degree.
5
The fisheries of the Northeast, however, still find themselves in a
precarious position. Though the stocks of the principal groundfish appear
to be rebounding, they remain quite low and in need of more time to
rebuild.6 To sustain their current growth, the fisheries must stay closely
monitored, and perhaps more importantly, minimally fished. Towards this
goal, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the federal agency
that oversees all commercial fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ),7 issued a proposed set of rules in March 2002 that would curtail
commercial fishing more drastically than it has been in the past.'
While the fisheries remain tenuously balanced between collapse and
recovery, the fishermen who try to make their livings from those fisheries
find themselves in an even more precarious position. New rules limiting
days at sea may well be necessary for the preservation of ailing fish stocks,
but they put yet another strain on the livelihoods of fishermen.9 Fishermen
hoping to stay in business face considerable challenges from regulatory
bodies like NMFS, depleted fish stocks, and competition from within an
extremely tight industry.
Because fishing is often a "boom or bust" industry, leaving fishermen
without cash for long periods of time, fishermen are often highly leveraged
and rely on credit for the extension of services and supplies."0 Fishermen
need boats; and boats need adequate supplies, wharfage, and repair from
shipyards and other facilities. Many of the fishermen who have been
strapped for cash in these last years of heavy restrictions on days at sea and
5. Anecdotal evidence suggests that fishing boats are pulling in large catches of the fish
that are the target of the regulatory framework. See Goad, supra note 2.
6. Scientists Report on Status of Three Fish Stocks-July 25, 2001 (July 25, 2001),
available at http://nefsc.nmfs.gov/pressrelease/advisoryOl.08.html (last visited Mar. 14,
2002).
7. NMFS is an agency under the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
which is, in turn, an agency under the Department of Commerce. The Exclusive Economic
Zone is roughly composed of those waters that are more than three miles and less than two
hundred miles off the coast of the United States (author's note).
8. John Richardson, Drastic Limits on Fishing Proposed, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD,
Mar. 2, 2002, at IA [hereinafter Richardson, Drastic Limits]. The proposed rules, a direct
response to Judge Kessler's ruling in Conservation Law Foundation v. Evans, supra note
4, would curtail days-at-sea and continue with a rolling series of areas closed to all
commercial fishing. Id.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Goad, supra note 2 (giving an example of one fisherman who quit fishing
in the face of huge costs for maintenance, fuel, dockage and miscellaneous repairs); Laura
Ruane, GulfShrimpers Feel Pinch, THE NEWS-PREsS (Fort Myers, Fl.), Jan. 18, 2003, at IA.
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total allowable catch have had to pay for these goods and services on credit.
The credit supplied by shipyards and other creditors gives rise to a
maritime lien, the ungainly sea creature that will be the subject of this
Comment.
A maritime lien gives a creditor, in the event of a default or other
defined trigger such as tort, the right to arrest and sell a vessel so that the
creditor can collect on her debts. What's more, it is not only the vessel that
is sold when a maritime lien is enforced; it is the vessel's appurtenances as
well." Appurtenances include a vessel's sails, equipment, and anything
that makes the vessel a "going concern."' 2 Recently, the First Circuit ruled
that fishing permits were so integral to a vessel that the permits should be
considered appurtenances and thus be sold with the vessel when a creditor
enforces a maritime lien. 3 This decision may prove to have far reaching
implications for the commercial fishing industry.
This Comment will address the issue of maritime liens and the recent
designation of fishing permits as appurtenances to those liens. The First
Circuit case of Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One'4 will be analyzed as a
current example of the issues and problems associated with that designa-
tion.
This Comment maintains that the inclusion of fishing permits as
appurtenances to maritime liens may endanger fishermen's livelihoods
more than it benefits the creditors who extend goods and services to
fishermen on credit. It will also argue that the inclusion of fishing permits
is not required by case law or by any existing statute. To the contrary, it
would be more equitable and less restrictive to treat fishing permits not as
appurtenances, but as a distinct piece of property, to be treated as collateral
in a separate maritime lien, enforced only if the value of the vessel itself is
not equal to or greater than the value of the goods and/or services extended.
Finally, it is important to mention what this Comment will not cover.
The universe of maritime liens is intricately tied to both the law of
admiralty and the law of secured transactions. It is my intention to provide
a brief overview of maritime liens, fishing permits, and the separate
regulatory regimes that control them for the purpose of elucidating and
11. Gowen, Inc. v. FN Quality One, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587, at *11 (D. Me.
2000).
12. A "going concern" is any commercial enterprise that is engaged in a business with
an expectation of staying in business indefinitely. BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 699 (7th ed.
1999). See infra for an expanded discussion of the nature of appurtenances.
13. Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 244 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2001).
14. Id.
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taking issue with the Gowen court's connection between fishing permits
and maritime liens. 15
lH. MARTIME LIENS
A maritime lien is a lien on a vessel that is given to secure the claim of
a creditor who has provided goods and services to the vessel or who has
suffered an injury caused by the vessel's operation. 6 Maritime liens, like
other liens, are important tools for both vessel owners and their creditors.
For vessel owners, a lien can provide valuable cash, supplies, and repairs.'
For creditors, the relatively easy applicability of maritime liens provides a
measure of protection in a trade that is, by its very nature, in a constant
state of flux.'S
Congress has addressed maritime liens in the Maritime Commercial
Instruments and Liens Vessel Identification System Act of 1988
(MCILVISA).' 9 In that Act, Congress designated a system for prioritizing
between ship mortgages, maritime liens and other security interests. 2 The
purpose of the Act, much like the purpose of maritime liens in general, was
to provide protection for maritime creditors in order to stimulate investment
in the shipping industry.2 The MCILVISA is applicable to all vessels
except "public vessels," regardless of whether those vessels are engaged in
15. The Maritime Commercial Instruments and liens Vessel Act of 1988,46 U.S.C.
§§ 31301-31343 (2001), the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000), and the current regulations affecting the fisheries of the
Northeastern United States, codified at 50 C.F.R. Part 648, will be the principle statutes
consulted in this Comment.
16. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 935 (7th ed. 1999).
17. Gowen, Inc. v. FN Quality One, 244 F.3d at 68 ("A familiar purpose of such liens
is to make readily available to a mobile borrower the secured credit that is often necessary
to ensure that a vessel can obtain the basic supplies or services needed for its operation").
18. 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 9-1, at 482 (2d ed.
1994) [hereinafter SCHOENBAUM] ("A maritime lien is a rough security device invented in
the nineteenth century to keep ships moving in commerce while preventing them from
escaping their debts by sailing away"). See also GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, THE
LAw oFADMIRALTY § 9-8, at 597 (2d ed. 1975) ("the rules which might fit stationary chattels
would not work in the case of ships which roamed the earth") [hereinafter GILMORE &
BLACK].
19. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301-31343 (2001).
20. 46 U.S.C. § 31301 (2001). The interpretive notes for this section indicate that the
MCILVISA "presumptively applies to determine questions of priorities between maritime
liens and ship mortgages in United States cases."
21. Faneuil Advisors, Inc. v. O/S Sea Hawk, 50 F.3d 88,92 (1st Cir. 1995).
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the shipping industry.2 2 As such, the provisions of the MCILVISA directly
affect those involved in the commercial fisheries.
A. Maritime Liens-A Primer
A maritime lien is a claim on a vessel-not on the owner or master of
the vessel-that arises from services rendered to that vessel or out of
injuries caused by that vessel.' As such, it is a debt instrument designating
a certain amount of money owed to either a voluntary or an involuntary
creditor. Maritime liens, like Article 9 liens,' are enforced in rem.25
However, that is where most of the similarities between maritime liens and
Article 9 liens end.2
Maritime liens are different in almost every respect from Article 9
liens.' Some of the principal differences between maritime liens and other
liens include: reversed chronological priority, secrecy, and the denial of
ownership rights to the lienor. To briefly explain each concept, reversed
chronological priority means that unlike traditional liens and security
interests, the last in time is the first in right.2 To be fully enforceable and
perfected, maritime liens do not require the creditor to have either
possession or to have provided notice to other creditors through filing, thus
a maritime lien is "secret." 29 Finally, the creditor has no right to control
the movements of the ship. 3o The creditor has no rights whatsoever in the
vessel, save the ability to have it arrested.3 The differences between
maritime liens and traditional liens are distinct enough to cause some
22. 46 U.S.C. § 31342 (2001).
23. ScHOENBAUM,supra note 18, § 9-1, at 481.
24. Article 9 is the comprehensive codification of law governing security interests in
most forms of personal property. It will be discussed more fully infra. UNuORM
COMMERCIAL CODE art. 9 (2001) [hereinafter U.C.C.]. All subsequent references to Article
9 will be made to the revised version of 2000.
25. GILMORE& BLACK,supra note 18, § 9-1, at 482 "The ship, personified, is itself-or
herself-the defendant in a proceeding in rem to enforce a lien").
26. In fact, maritime liens, though nebulous and secret, are good against "dry land"
hens, even those that are properly perfected security interests under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Matter of Topgallant Lines, Inc., 154 B.R. 368, 376 (S.D. Ga. 1993)
("Although few cases have dealt specifically with clashes between the UCC and maritime
law, those decisions which have addressed the issue resolve any conflict in favor of maritime
law").
27. GnIMORE& BLAcK, supra note 18, § 9-1, at 586 ("A maritime lien, so-called, is not
a lien at all in the common-law sense of the term").
28. Id. § 9-2, at 588.
29. Id
30. Id.
31. Id.
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commentators to lament the confusion caused by the use of the moniker
"lien" in this context.32 As Gilmore and Black point out, a "lien is a lien is
a lien, but a maritime lien is not."3
1. How (and why) do maritime liens arise?
Maritime liens can arise through either contract or tort. They can arise
through claims against the furnishing of "necessaries" to a vessel, salvage
operations, preferred ship mortgages, claims for damage or loss of cargo,
pollution claims, and other claims against a vessel.3' "Necessaries" can be
best understood as those things that a vessel needs in order to continue on
her way, such as repair services or ship supplies.35
In the absence of payment, a maritime lien will arise anytime a supplier
or dockmaster furnishes necessaries to a vessel or that vessel is involved in
a tortious incident and incurs liability.36 Maritime liens arise automatically;
that is, there is no need to perfect the lien by filing with a requisite
governmental agency.3 As soon as a vessel owes money the maritime lien
arises, even in the absence of a recordation, filing or public acknowledg-
ment.
Under MCILVISA, however, Congress has established a system
whereby a lien claimant may file a notice with a U.S. Coast Guard
Documentation Office.3 MCILVISA makes it clear that any person who
furnishes necessaries to a vessel has a maritime lien and may bring an
action in rem to enforce that lien, whether or not there is a filed notice of
the lien. 39 This notice serves to effectively "clear the air" with respect to
32. GILMORE& BLACK, supra note 18, §9-1, at 589 ("Clarity of thought is not promoted
when, by an accident of linguistic history, two unlike things are called by the same name
.... The law of maritime liens might well have been worked out more satisfactorily than
it has been if the unfortunate term 'lien' had not come into use during the nineteenth
century").
33. ld.
34. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 18, § 9-1, at 483-485.
35. See 46 U.S.C. § 31301 (2001) ("'Necessaries' includes repairs, supplies towage,
and the use of a dry dock or marine railway").
36. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 18, § 9-1, at 490.
37. Il ("A maritime lien arises from the moment of the service or occurrence that
provides its basis. The lien is non-consensual and unrecorded. It follows the vessel into the
hands of even a good faith purchaser").
38. 46 U.S.C. § 31343(a) (2001). To be recordable the notice must include the nature
of the lien, the date the lien was established, the amount of the lien, the name and address
of the claimant, and be signed and acknowledged. Id. Of course, the lien is not extinguished
or nullified in the absence of such a notice-the notice serves only to better warn others of
the claim against the vessel.
39. 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a) (2001).
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obligations that the vessel may have, but the notice is not a prerequisite to
liability.
2. In Rem--or, why the boat is to blame
In The Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that a "ship is the
most living of inanimate things." One of the principal differences
between maritime liens and other liens is the nature of the obligor. A
maritime lien is an instrument that is held by the creditor against the vessel
itself, not against the vessel's owner, lessee, master or anyone else.'
Claimants who wish to enforce a maritime lien bring a proceeding in rem
against the vessel.42 The language used by Justice Marshall in one of the
seminal American cases addressing the in rem proceeding to enforce
maritime liens is worth quoting in full here:
But this is not a proceeding against the owner, it is a proceeding
against the vessel, for an offence committed by the vessel, which
is not less an offence, and does not the less subject her to forfei-
ture, because it was committed without the authority, and against
the will of the owner. It is true, that inanimate matter can commit
no offence. The mere wood, iron, and sails of the ship, cannot, of
themselves, violate the law. But this body is animated and put in
action by the crew, who are guided by the master. The vessel acts
and speaks by the master. She reports herself by the master. It is,
therefore, not unreasonable, that the vessel should be affected by
this report.43
The theory behind this curious mechanism is that the owner is often not
in a position to control the vessel. Thus, it would be inequitable to hold the
owner personally responsible for liabilities taken on by the vessel."
Maritime liens follow the boat, remora-like, even after the vessel changes
hands. As such, a consequence of the proceeding in rem is that the
maritime lien follows the boat from owner to owner, even if the new owner
40. OuvER WENDEiLHOLmES, THE COMMON LAW 25 (Mark Dewolfe Howe, ed., The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1963) (1881).
41. GILMORE & BLAcK, supra note 18, § 9-2, at 589.
42. Id.
43. The Little Charles, 26 Fed.Cas. 979, 982 (C.C.D.Va. 1819). Similarly, Justice
Story wrote, in the Brig MalekAdhel, 43 U.S. 210,233 (1844), the "vessel which commits
the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the
forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the
owner."
44. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 18, § 9-1. at491 n. 67.
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is a good faith purchaser who buys the vessel without knowledge of the
liens against it.
4 5
This idea that the vessel can itself be responsible for its debts is, of
course, a handy fiction.' The in rem proceeding gives creditors the power
to collect on their debts immediately, rather than trying to chase down an
owner who may live on another continent, and enables courts to enforce
liens that might otherwise go unenforced. Otherwise, vessels could slip
into the fog, sold to a good-faith purchaser on the other side of the globe,
while the supplier who provided sailcloth, for example, would be left
entirely empty-handed.47
3. The mechanics of a maritime lien
Once a maritime lien has been recognized to exist, how does it work?
The maritime lien gives a creditor a jus in re, a "right in a thing."' As
such, that right is a proprietary right, giving the holder of the maritime lien
the right to "take the thing from one who possesses it, and to subject it by
a sale to the payment of his debt."' 9 A proceeding against a vessel does, of
course, have very real legal consequences for the owners of
vessels-regardless of the fiction that the vessel is paying her own
debts-in that the practical result of a proceeding in rem against a vessel
is the sale of the vessel to pay for the lien.' These real life consequences
are illustrated by the circumstances surrounding the sale of the fishing
vessel Quality One.
45. Paul M. Hebert, The Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens, 4TUL L REV. 381,390
(1929-30). Hebert says, "[olne judge has gone so far as to say that a vessel is subject to a
maritime lien for collision if it is stolen." lit
46. See HOLMES, supra note 40, at 25. There he wrote that it "is only by supposing the
ship to have been treated as if endowed with personality, that the arbitrary seeming
peculiarities of the maritime law can be made intelligible, and on that supposition they at
once become consistent and logical."
47. See, for example, GR.MORE & BLACK, supra note 18, § 9-8, at 597, giving the
example of the fraudulent practice of purchasing a car on credit in New York and selling it
in Arizona to a purchaser who buys in good-faith, knowing nothing about the lien on the car
back in New York. Compare that with the maritime lien, where one who buys a vessel with
an outstanding maritime lien without knowledge of that lien is still subject to the lien's
enforcement regardless of the lienor's assertion or lack thereof of the maritime lien. Article
9, on the other hand, requires a lienor to actively assert his rights against a good-faith
purchaser in order to maintain his security interest. U.C.C. § 9-320, cmt. 3.
48. SCHOENBAUM,supra note 18, § 9-1, at481.
49. Hebert, supra note 45, at 405.
50. See US at 392.
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There, Gowen, Inc. (Gowen) was a Portland, Maine company that had
provided $12,000 of wharfage services and repairs to the Quality One.5'
The invoices for those services were unpaid. Gowen filed an action in the
federal district court to recover its debts. However, neither Quality One nor
her owners made any response.5 2 Without a response, Gowen was able to
obtain a warrant for the arrest of the vessel. The vessel was arrested
pursuant to a warrant that commanded the seizure of "her equipment,
engines, and appurtenances."53 Subsequent to the arrest, Gowen obtained
a default judgment against the vessel and immediately moved for its sale.
Pursuant to the order of the District Court, the United States Marshal's
office seized the boat, advertised it locally, and publicly auctioned the
vessel. At the auction, only two bids were submitted. Of those, Andrew
Todd offered $17,000 for the vessel and her appurtenances, having been
notified that the sale was going to be challenged by the vessel's previous
owners in court. His bid was accepted, and he paid $17,000 that same day.
The sale price was well below the $49,500 paid for the same vessel in
1997.54
It was only after the sale of the vessel that the owners of the Quality
One, Nunya, Inc., filed suit in the federal District Court, arguing that the
auction price was too low and that the fishing permits should not have been
sold with the boat. 55
51. Bart Jansen, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Maine Fishing Permits Decision,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct. 1,2001, at BI [hereinafterJansen, Supreme Court]; Gowen,
Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587, at *2 (D. Me. 2000).
52. Practically speaking, of course, the only party who could provide an answer to the
motion would have been the Quality One's owners.
53. Gowen, Inc. v. FN Quality One, 244 F.3d 64,65 (2001).
54. These facts are accumulated from Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 244 F.3d 64;
Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587; and Jansen, Supreme Court,
supra note 51.
55. Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587, at *2.
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B. Appurtenances and Their Wide Net
What does it mean that the Quality One was sold with her "appurte-
nances"? Appurtenances are those things that are not the vessel herself, but
give the vessel a sense of identity, without which she would be less than
whole.' In its Gowen holding, the First Circuit wrote that, "traditionally,
a maritime lien attaches not only to the bare vessel but also to equipment
that is used aboard the vessel and is essential to its operation."57 For
example, fairly obvious examples of appurtenances might be the tackle and
sails of a schooner, or the engine block of a lobster boat."8 But what about
the refrigerator in the galley of the schooner that the owners have rented for
its busy summer charter season? And what about the traps stacked up on
the stern of the lobster boat? Are both of these so integral to the operation
of the vessel that they would go with the vessel in an action to enforce a
maritime lien?
59
1. What is an appurtenance?
Appurtenances make a vessel a going concern, but include more than
what is required to make the vessel capable of navigation. This definition
goes back to at least the middle of the nineteenth century. In an early case,
The Witch Queen, a federal district court judge in California was con-
fronted with the question of whether a diving-bell and air-pump should be
included as appurtenances.' The decision notes that the enforcement of a
maritime lien is a proceeding in rem against "a ship, her tackle, sails,
apparel, furniture, boats, or other appurtenances"6 (emphasis added). The
Court concluded:
56. See 70 AM. JuR. 2D Shipping § 573 (1987) ("A maritime lien extends to the ship's
hull, engine, tackle, sails, rigging, furniture and equipment. The determination of whether
equipment is integral to the vessel and therefore lienable under the statute must be made on
a factual basis in each individual case").
57. Gowen, Inc. v. FN Quality One, 244 F.3d at 67 (internal citations omitted).
58. See GIMORE & BLACK, supra note 18, § 9-19, at 622-23 n. 80.
59. Though it would depend on the specific circumstances of each case, the answer is
most likely yes. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 18, § 9-1, at 488, writes: "Examples of
accessories and appurtenances to which a lien on a vessel attaches include a winch and a
gallowses installed on a fishing boat, fishing stores onboard a whaling ship, cement loading,
bagging, and unloading equipment, a refrigerator on a ship carrying meat as cargo, a diving
bell and air pump used for pearl fishing, and tanks used to carry oil."
60. The Witch Queen, 30 F.Cas. 396, 397 (1874).
61. Id.
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The previous enumeration of 'tackle, sails, apparel, furniture and
boats,' includes everything belonging to the vessel as a 'navigating
ship.' Unless the word 'appurtenances' applies to other objects on
board belonging to the owners, for the purposes of the voyage, it
can have no operation.62
Thus, the diving-bells and everything else on board the vessel Witch Queen
for the "purposes of the voyage" were included as appurtenances, and thus
included in the lien against the vessel.'
Another case addressing the issue of appurtenances is The Joseph
Warner." In this case, the court faced the issue of whether a "deck winch,
a pair of gallowses, a compass and a set of running lights"65 were improp-
erly removed by a defaulting owner who knew that the fishing vessel was
subject to a maritime lien.' These assorted items were on the vessel when
the services giving rise to the maritime lien were provided, yet missing
when the creditor moved to enforce the lien.67 The court, in deciding that
the items were appurtenances to be included with the maritime lien,
analogized the situation to the doctrine of fixtures in realty law, saying that
a mortgagor cannot rightfully remove fixtures that have added value to the
real estate while the mortgage is still in force.' The court ultimately ruled
that "whatever is placed in a vessel subject to a lien to carry out the
purposes for which the vessel was equipped, increasing its value for use
although it may be removed without injury to itself or to the vessel,
becomes a part of the vessel, as between lienor and owner, and cannot be
removed or otherwise disposed of while the lien is in force."'69
Thus, an appurtenance can be understood to be something placed on a
vessel that enables that vessel to "carry out the purposes for which the
vessel was equipped." In other words, "appurtenance" is an almost
metaphysical term-one that includes those items that help a sailboat to sail
and a lobster boat to lobster.
62. 1L
63. 1d at 398.
64. The Joseph Warner, 32 F. Supp. 532 (D. Mass. 1939).
65. ld. at 533.
66. 1d
67. Id
68. Id at 534.
69. The Joseph Warner, 32 F. Supp. at 532.
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2. Other owners take care!
Since The Witch Queen, the rule regarding appurtenances has been
expanded to include even those appurtenances onboard that are being used
for the specific voyage, but do not belong to the owner of the vessel. In
Turner v. United States,7° the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
refrigerator not owned by the owners of a vessel that sank in a collision
with another vessel was a part of the ship; and, as such, it "as part of the
res, must share the loss.""1 The court explained, "though there be separate
ownership of the res when it is made answerable for torts committed by the
vessel, and though there be separate ownership of the refrigerating plant,
as between the parties to the charter, it is a part of the vessel, to which
those suffering damages are entitled to look for reimbursement for torts
committed by the vessel." 2
In essence, the court in Turner is prioritizing the right of the lienholder
to reimbursement for a tortious debt over any proprietary rights held by the
owner of the refrigerator. As such, a maritime lien, though the proceeding
in rem is supposed to affect only the vessel herself, has a sphere of
influence that can have real legal and financial consequences for vessel
owners and even those whose only involvement with a particular voyage is
the leasing of equipment to the vessel.
3. Intangibles
The net cast by the term "appurtenances" may have been made wider
still in 1927, when the Supreme Court decided the case United States v.
Freights, Etc., of S.S. Mount Shasta.73 In that case, the United States
owned the steamship Mount Shasta. The United States chartered that
vessel to the Victor S. Fox and Company, Inc. ("Fox"), reserving a lien on
all cargoes and subfreights for any unpaid dues under the terms of the
charter.74 Subsequently, Fox made a voyage to the Gold Coast of Africa to
bring a cargo of mahogany logs back to the United States. The voyage was
successful, except that Fox never paid the United States. The United States
sued to recover a debt of about $390,000.75 But because the United States
owned the Mount Shasta, it would do no good to attach the vessel. Instead,
70. Turner v. United States, 27 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1928).
71. d at 136.
72. id
73. United States v. Freights, Etc., of S.S. Mount Shasta, 274 U.S. 466 (1927).
74. Id. at469.
75. Id
Hook, Line and Sinker
the United States brought an action in rem against the right to payment
itself.76 The District Court ruled that because there was no physical res that
could be attached, the suit must be dismissed." The Supreme Court
reversed, hearing the case on direct appeal.7" Justice Holmes wrote:
By the general logic of the law a debt may be treated as a res as
easily as a ship. It is true that it is not tangible, but it is a right of
the creditor's capable of being attached and appropriated by the
law to the creditor's duties. The ship is not a res because it is
tangible but because it is a focus of rights that in like manner may
be dealt with by the law. It is no more a res than a copyright.79
Thus, though the right to payment was itself intangible, the Court ruled
that proprietary rights can attach to a right to payment or other intangible
in the same manner as they can to a physical object like a ship. Therefore,
there is nothing to prevent a suit in rem against an intangible right to
payment. It is perhaps important to note, however, that Freights of Mount
Shasta does not explicitly treat the intangible debt as an appurtenance to a
lien on the vessel; instead the debt itself is the subject of the lien.
I][. THE NATURE OF FEDERAL FISHING PERMITS
Now that the maritime lien has been explored, it is necessary to inquire
whether a fishing permit should be appropriately considered as property for
the purposes of securing a maritime lien. And in order to do that, it is first
necessary to explain what a fishing permit is.
Exactly what is the holder of a fishing permit entitled to do with that
permit? Who (or what) is the rightful holder of the permit? How can the
government presume to claim ownership of the bounty of the seas lying
below the surface many miles from shore?" Do fishing permits give the
76. l This right to payment is, in Article 9 terms, an account. Accounts are readily
recognized as property for the purposes of collateral and security interests. See U.C.C. § 9-
312 (2000).
77. United States v. Freights, Etc., of S.S. Mount Shasta, 274 U.S. at 470.
78. 1d at 469.
79. Id. at 470. Holmes wrote over the dissent of Justice McReynolds. McReynolds
insisted that "jurisdiction is founded upon physical power over ares within the district upon
the theory that it is a 'contracting or offending entity,' a 'debtor' or 'offending thing,'
something that can be arrested or taken into custody, or which can fairly be taken as tangible
property." Id at 471, 472.
80. See Alison Reiser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries:
Contracting for the Commons?, 24 EcoLOGY LQ. 813,829 (1997) (demonstrating that the
"current management system under the Magnuson-Stevens Act is based on a property regime
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holder of the permit some property right in the fish they are licensed to
harvest?8'
Generally speaking, a fishing permit is the means by which legislature
and fishery management bodies regulate and control access to a particular
fishery.8 2 Fishing permits are notoriously difficult to categorize with
respect to whether or not they are property, or create a property right in the
fish to be harvested. 3 The application for and issuance of fishing permits
is a process entitled to the guarantees of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws."
Other licenses, such as a state-issued liquor license, have been deemed
to be "personal property" and can be used as collateral in which a security
interest can be created, 5 subject to the provisions of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code that address general intangibles." Fishing
permits, however, are not often treated as property for the purposes of
Article 9 security interests.8 7 Further, commercial fishing permits are
of state ownership with government-devised regulation, although an industry-dominated
consultative system plays a substantial role").
81. Most state and federal fishery management plans emphasize that fishing permits are
privileges, and do not establish a property right in the fish. However, simply labeling a
commercial fishing permit as a "privilege" does not mean that that is how the courts (and the
IRS) will see the matter. See Jon David Weiss, Note, A Taxing Issue: Are Limited Entry
Fishing Permits Property? 9 ALASKA L REV. 93, 105-112 (1992). There, Weiss
demonstrates that Alaskan limited-entry fishing permits are both valuable and transferable
and says that the legislature "unwittingly" created property subject to a federal tax lien. Of
course, the Gowen court's ruling that fishing permits are appurtenances to maritime liens
seems to have edged the fishing permit closer still to true property-.there the Court did not
elaborate on whether their decision would necessitate the treatment of fishing permits as
property. In a respondent's brief for a case that was seeking certiorari at the same time
Gowen was decided, the Solicitor General of the United States, Ted Olson, argued that
fishing permits treated as appurtenances to maritime liens should not be treated as property.
He writes, "[flishing privileges that serve as security interests are subject to the same
regulatory requirements as privileges that do not; the privileges do not convey a property
interest in fish or a fishery or a right to be free of future regulatory changes." Brief for the
Federal Respondents in Opposition at *5, Daniels v. Patenaude, No. 01-126, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2001/0responses/2001-0126.resp.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2002).
82. 35A AM. JuR. 2D Fish, Game, and Wildlife Conservation § 40 (2001).
83. See infra, section V(C)(2).
84. 35A AM. JuR. 2D Fish, Game, and Wildlife Conservation § 40 (2001) (citing
Bartlett v. State Commercial Fisheries Entry Com'n, 948 P.2d 987 (Alaska 1997)).
85. See 68A AM. JUR. 2D Secured Transactions § 113 (1993).
86. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-301, cmt. 4 (2000).
87. It is as yet unsettled how the Gowen decision will affect the treatment of fishing
permits for the purposes of Article 9 (author's note).
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issued by many different regulatory bodies."8 Some fishing permits are
issued to individual commercial fishermen 9 while others are issued to the
vessel itself.'
Federal fishing permits are controlled by a strict and expansive
regulatory regime.9' The management of the nation's fisheries is controlled
primarily by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act),' originally enacted in 1976 in response to
several findings of Congress relating to the threats facing both the fisheries
and the nation's fishing communities.93 While giving considerable leeway
to the various regional fishery management councils that were established
by the Magnuson-Stevens Act,' the Magnuson-Stevens Act provides the
framework that all fishing management plans must correspond to.95 As
such, to better understand the nature of federal fishing permits, it is
important to understand the findings, stated purposes and major provisions
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act before examining the particular regulations
controlling federal fishing permits.
A. Overview of the Magnuson-Stevens Act
In the middle part of the last century, the world catch of fish was
increasing at a dramatic rate of approximately seven percent each year.'
This led to a doubling in total world catch every ten to twelve years.' The
drastic increase in fishing pressure led to unprecedented strain on the
88. See Robin Kundis Craig, Sustaining the Unknown Seas: Changes in U.S. Ocean
Policy and Regulation Since Rio 1992, 32 ENVTL L REP. 10190, 10211 (2002). There are
eight Regional Councils acting under the authority of the National Marine Fisheries Service.
89. Permits are issued directly to vessel owners in the Pacific groundfish fisheries. 50
C.F.R. § 660.333 (2002).
90. This will be discussed in more detail infra, but in the northeast, multispecies
permits are issued directly to the vessel, rather than the owner. 50 C.F.R. § 648.4(a) (2002).
91. For example, the single section of the Federal Register that addresses federal fishing
permits in the northeastern United States alone runs to nearly two hundred fifty pages. See
50 C.F.R. § 648 (2002).
92. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1801-1883 (2000).
93. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000).
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5) (2000).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a) (2000). See also Reiser, supra note 80, at 829 ( "Ihe U.S.
system follows neither fisheries co-management nor fisheries self-governance; it is a
decentralized management system heavily structured and constrained by national procedural
requirements and standards").
96. FANCIS T. CHISrY, JR. & ANTHONY SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN
FISHERIES: SOME PROBLEMS OF GROWTH AND ECONOMIC AuxOCATION vii (2d ed. 1972).
97. l.
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world's oceans. Fisheries' observers watching the rate of increase in catch
remain more or less stable even as the number of fishing vessels on the
world's oceans increased dramatically and technological advances in
fishing vessels and gear opened up new waters for exploitation clearly
demonstrated this strain."' By the 1970's, it was obvious to observers of
the commercial fishing industry that something had to be done about the
exploding trends in the world's fisheries.
In response to the overfishing crisis, Congress passed the Magnuson-
Stevens Act in the mid-1970's.99 Congress found that the fish off of the
nation's coasts and in the high seas "constitute valuable and renewable
natural resources.""' Congress also found that the stocks of some species
of fish were being depleted at such a rate that the commercial extinction of
once teeming stocks of fish, such as the Atlantic cod, was a very real
possibility.'0 ' The 1976 version of the Magnuson-Stevens Act identified
fish stock reduction due to overfishing as the principal factor in the demise
of the world's fisheries."°2 The 1996 amendments made it clear that
increased fishing pressure was only part of the problem; direct and indirect
habitat loss and the failure of fishery management programs also contrib-
uted to the problem.0 3
Congress further found that the commercial and recreational fisheries
have historically been a large economic boom to the United States, and that
"activities of massive foreign fishing fleets" have contributed to overfishing
and the general economic malaise of coastal areas."0 The agreements that
the United States had made with other nations had been largely ineffective
at stemming the abuse of the fisheries, and there were signs that the
fisheries may be rendered useless before an effective, multilateral,
international agreement.
However, the Congressional outlook in its findings was not entirely
bleak. Congress found that the fisheries, while depleted and finite, were
renewable; and that under a sound national program, the recent trends in
98. See id at 104-37.
99. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883. The problems in the nation's fisheries had been apparent
for some time. For an interesting discussion of the problem as it was perceived in the mid-
1960's, and of how the problem worsened into the seventies, see CHRISTY, JR. & SCOTT,
supra note 96.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1) (1996).
101. See id. § 1801(a)(3)-(4); see also MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHYOFTHE
FISH THAT CHANGED THE WoRLD 177-233 (1997).
102. 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000) (original 1976 language is found in the history to the
section).
103. Id. § 1801(a).
104. Id § 1801(a)(3).
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overfishing and the collapse of fisheries might be contained and even
reversed. '5
1. Congressional purposes behind the Magnuson-Stevens Act
It was with the above findings in mind that Congress passed the
Magnuson-Stevens Act. With the Magnuson-Stevens Act, Congress sought
to accomplish several objectives. First and perhaps foremost, Congress
sought to "take immediate action to conserve and manage the fishery
resources found off of the coasts of the United States.' ' 1°6 To that end, the
Magnuson-Stevens Act was to protect "essential fish habitat" and
determine "optimum yields" for the various fisheries in order to stave off
further stock collapses. 7
Another purpose of the Magnuson-Stevens Act was "to promote
domestic commercial and recreational fishing under sound conservation
and management principles."'" In other words, the Magnuson-Stevens Act
was passed not only to conserve the fish stocks that were in rapid decline,
but also to preserve the fishing industry itself. The goal of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act was not conservation for the sole sake of conservation, but
conservation for the sake of the fishing industry as well.
2. Major provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act
One of the most dramatic changes that the Magnuson-Stevens Act
brought to fishery management was the extension of United States
jurisdiction to two hundred nautical miles off of the coast."° With that
extension, the EEZ was born. The EEZ was propounded by the Magnuson-
Stevens Act and actually established by "Proclamation Numbered 5030" on
March 10, 1983. "0 The EEZ was put into place to prevent the unbridled
pillaging of fish stocks by foreign fishing vessels that had sometimes been
taking place within sight of land."' The EEZ, originally contemplated as
a fishery management tool, has come to be a valuable tool in, among other
105. I& § 1801(a)(4).
106. Id. § 1801(b)(1).
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(4).
108. id. § 1801(b)(3).
109. 16 U.S.C. § 1811(a). The previous extent of U.S. jurisdiction was the right that
President Truman claimed to the continental shelf in 1945 in order to control the mineral
resources located there. KURLANSKY, supra note 101, at 160.
110. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(11).
111. See 16U.S.C. § 1801.
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things, trade control, the drug war, and more recently, the search for
terrorists.
With the establishment of the EEZ, Congress was not acting unilater-
ally on the world stage in extending United States sovereignty over a
greater portion of the oceans. A number of other countries (notably
Iceland, Norway, and several Latin American countries) and the European
Economic Community had already declared, or were about to declare, two
hundred mile fishing zones." 2
The Magnuson-Stevens Act also set up a framework for the establish-
ment of Regional Fishery Management Councils (Regional Councils). 113
These councils were to be composed not only of government officials, but
of representatives from "the fishing industry, consumer and environmental
organizations, and other interested persons.... 4 The councils were set up
regionally, as opposed to nationally, so that they might better "take into
account the social and economic needs of the States.'" 15
The Magnuson-Stevens Act provided two avenues by which fishery
management plans could be produced. The management plans could come
from the Regional Councils or directly from the Secretary of Commerce. " 6
No matter the source of the management plan, the Magnuson-Stevens Act
required certain elements for any management plan." 7 Among those
requirements, a fishery management plan must assess both the maximum
sustainable yield and the optimum yield for the managed fishery,"' include
a "fishery impact statement" that details the likely effects of the plan on
"participants in the fishery and fishing communities affected by the
plan,""' 9 and "allocate harvest restrictions or recovery benefits fairly and
equitably among the commercial, recreational, and charter fishing sectors
in the fishery."12
For the purposes of this Comment, the more relevant provisions of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act with respect to fishery management plans are in
those provisions left to the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce' 2' or
112. KURLANSKY, supra note 101, at 166-173.
113. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5).
114. ld.
115. d
116. See 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a).
117. Id
118. Id § 1853(a)(3).
119. Id § 1853(a)(9).
120. Id § 1853(a)(14).
121. The Secretary of Commerce has delegated its power here to the National Marine
Fisheries Service, a regulatory division of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. See generally http.//www.noaa.gov (last visited Apr. 25, 2003).
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the Regional Councils. Fishery management plans may, under the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, require fishing permits with respect to any U.S.
fishing vessel or the operator of any U.S. fishing vessel. 2 Furthermore,
fishery management plans can designate zones where fishing is limited or
prohibited," 3 establish catch, sale and transport limits,1 4 and prohibit or
limit the use of certain fishing gear." 5
Perhaps most importantly, the Magnuson-Stevens Act enables fishery
management plans to establish systems that limit access to the fishery in
order to achieve optimum yield. " In establishing a limited-access system,
the fishery management plan must take into account the present participa-
tion in the fishery, historical fishing practices in the fishery, the economics
of the fishery, the ability of the fishing vessels used in the managed fishery
to participate in other fisheries, and "the cultural and social framework
relevant to the fishery and any affected fishing communities. ""2 In other
words, a fishery management plan limiting access to a particular fishery
must demonstrate how that limited access will affect those who participate
in the fishery. These limited access systems now control most major
fisheries in the United States.12
With the Magnuson-Stevens Act, Congress intended to protect not just
the ailing fish stocks, but those fishermen and fishing communities who
depend on the wealth of the oceans for economic, physical, and cultural
sustenance.
B. The Mechanics of Fishing Permits
in the Northeastern United States
The Magnuson-Stevens Act provides the skeletal framework for fishery
management and the issuance of federal fishing permits; substance and
detail is in the various regional regulations. The extensive, and compli-
cated, regulations covering the Northeastern United States, codified at 50
C.F.R. § 648 (section 648), will be the focus of this section."n This
discussion is not intended to summarize all of the regulations, but to give
an overview of the pertinent regulations in light of their relevance to the
122. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(1)(A)&(B).
123. d § 1853(b)(2).
124. l41 § 1853(b)(3).
125. Id. § 1853(b)(4).
126. ld § 1853(b)(6).
127. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(6)(A)-(F).
128. See Craig, supra note 88, at 10213.
129. Fisheries of the Northeastern United States, 50 C.F.R. § 648 (2002).
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discussion of the inclusion of fishing permits as appurtenances to maritime
liens.
Section 648 provides a highly specific definition of each northeast
fishery,'" outlining exactly the sort of fish to be covered by the regulations.
Each fishery has specific restrictions with regard to fishing gear, area
closures, total allowable catch, minimum and maximum size limits, etc. 3 '
Subpart A of section 648 contains the general provisions to which all
northeast fisheries must adhere. The requirements relating to the issuance
of vessel permits are part of these general provisions.
The issuance of any given fishing permit is specific to the fishery for
which it is issued.'32 For example, the limited access multispecies permit
(LAMP) is a classic example of the northeastern permit issuance regime. 33
The permits are issued to a vessel, not to an owner or an operator of the
vessel, on an annual basis."3 These permits are not easy to obtain, as
eligibility for a LAMP is dependent on meeting one of three qualifications.
A vessel must: (i) have been issued a LAMP for the preceding year; (ii) be
replacing a vessel that was issued a LAMP for the preceding year; or (iii)
be replacing a vessel that was issued a confirmation of permit history.135
This means that the availability of a LAMP is virtually shut off to those
outside the industry. It is impossible to obtain a LAMP without having had
one already, or knowing someone who has had a LAMP who is leaving the
fishery.
Given that the LAMP is issued to the vessel, rather than the vessel's
owner or operator, it makes sense that the "fishing and permit history of a
vessel is presumed to transfer with the vessel whenever it is bought, sold,
or otherwise transferred," unless there is an agreement otherwise."3 A
LAMP, however, may be issued to a vessel that is replacing another vessel
that has sunk or otherwise become inoperable, subject to the conditions that
the replacement vessel is about the same size and power of the vessel that
130. i § 648.2.
131. See iU § 648, subparts B-N.
132. 50 C.F.R. § 648.4 (2002).
133. Id. § 648.4(a)(i). This discussion is particularly relevant because the Quality One,
the vessel in question in the Gowen case, had a LAMP, in addition to several other permits.
Gowen, Inc. v. FN Quality One, 244 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 2001).
134. 50 C.F.R. § 648.4(a)(i) (2002). This is a part of the Gowen court's argument. It
would, of course, be much more difficult to argue that fishing permits are appurtenances to
a vessel if those permits were issued to an owner or operator instead of to the vessel itself.
135. Id.
136. lit § 648(a)(i)(D).
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it is replacing '37-meaning that the permit is not lost entirely in the
unfortunate event that the vessel meets an untimely demise. 3 '
In theory, if not in practice, a LAMP is nontransferable. Section 648.4
makes no provisions for the transferability of the permits, and in fact,
provides a specific restriction on "permit splitting:" "A limited access
permit issued pursuant to this section may not be issued to a vessel or its
replacement or remain valid, if the vessel's permit or fishing history has
been used to qualify another vessel for another Federal fishery."' 39
However, the regulations are silent as to the use of the vessel's permit or
fishing history to qualify another vessel for the same fishery. According to
one source, fishermen "routinely advertise the sale of certain types of
permits for tens of thousands of dollars, which they can accomplish by
selling a boat with a permit and then immediately buying it back without
the permit."'"' Thus, through a complicated practice of dubious legality,
LAMPs are transferable.
These characteristics imply that, under the regulatory regime estab-
lished by section 648, fishing permits are of significant value to those who
hold them-and what's more, extremely difficult to replace once lost.
IV. FACTS AND LAW IN THE GOWEN CASE
Now armed with the requisite background information on maritime
liens and fishing permits, it is appropriate to discuss how the Gowen court's
inclusion of fishing permits as appurtenances to maritime liens may have
unwittingly affected fishing communities adversely. Although most of the
Gowen facts have been recited above, a modest summary follows.
A. The Gowen Facts
Essentially, the vessel Quality One owed money for wharfage and
repairs. 14' Gowen, Inc., the wharfage and vessel-repair services company
that extended the services to the Quality One, had not been paid, and
137. Id § 648(a)(i)(E)(l)&(2).
138. Id § 648(a)(i)(J) (2002) provides that a "confirmation of permit history" may be
issued to a person who does not currently own a vessel, but who has, in the past, owned a
qualifying vessel that has "sunk, been destroyed, or transferred to another person," so long
as that person has retained the fishing and permit history of the original vessel. This
confirmation of permit history makes that person eligible to apply for a new LAMP, issued
to a replacement vessel.
139. 50 C.F.R. § 648(a)(i)(L).
140. Jansen, Supreme Court, supra note 51, at B1.
141. Gowen, Inc. v. FV Quality One, 244 F.3d 64, 65 (1st Cir. 2001).
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brought an action in federal district court to enforce the maritime lien. 42
The court enforced the lien, ordering a public auction of the vessel,
including "any valid fishing permits and history to the extent permitted by
applicable law."' 43 The vessel was sold for $17,000.' 44
After Nunya, Inc., the former owner of the Quality One, protested the
sale price and the inclusion of the fishing permits, arguing that the fishing
permits were not subject to arrest by the U.S. Marshal, 45 the district
confirmed both the sale price and the inclusion of the fishing permits."
Nunya, Inc. and the Quality One appealed both the sale price and the
inclusion of the fishing permits to the First Circuit. 47 The First Circuit
recognized both the difficulty and the novelty of the case, but affirmed the
district court's decision. 48 It is the reasoning of the First Circuit's opinion
on the issue of the inclusion of fishing permits as appurtenances that this
section will focus on.
B. The Gowen Court's Interpretation of the Law
The First Circuit recognizes that there is "no authoritative answer as to
[whether] fishing permits should be classed" either as appurtenances or as
an entirely separate asset, unrelated to the vessel. 49 Furthermore, the court
cites the commentator Schoenbaum,'" writing "the determination of
[whether something is an appurtenance] is commonly made on a case-by-
case basis without great consistency of results."'' In other words, the First
Circuit begins its discussion of the inclusion of fishing permits as
appurtenances hesitantly, recognizing that it is-to abuse another maritime
clich6-venturing into uncharted waters.
As the first step towards its ultimate conclusion, the Court adopts the
traditional definition of appurtenances, saying "a maritime lien attaches not
only to the bare vessel but also to equipment that is used aboard the vessel
142. Id
143. Id
144. l at 66.
145. Gowen, Inc. v. FN Quality One, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587 at *2 (D. Me. 2000).
146. Id at *21.
147. Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 244 F.3d at 66.
148. Id at 71.
149. Id at 68. Later in the opinion, the Court again makes mention of the fact that there
is no clear consensus in the maritime world, saying "[tlhere is no evidence of any common
understanding in the maritime world that permits are, or are not, subject to liens." Id at 69.
150. SCHOENBAum, supra note 18.
151. Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 244 F.3d at 68.
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and is essential to the vessel's navigation, operation, or mission."'52 The
Court, perhaps misreading the Freights of the Mount Shasta case discussed
infra, notes that "there is no general objection to treating an intangible as
an appurtenance."' 5 3 The Court continues, saying that if fishing permits are
not to be treated as appurtenances, they are "merely personal property of
the owner, like a desk in a steamship company office."''
With at least an abstract definition of what constitutes an appurtenance,
the Court's next step examines the purported purpose of a maritime lien.
According to the Court, that purpose is to "make readily available to a
mobile borrower the secured credit that is often necessary to ensure that a
vessel can obtain the basic supplies or services needed for its operation. "055
As a final premise, the Court looks to the purpose behind federal
fishing permits. These permits, the Court suggests, are issued by the
government in an effort to closely manage stocks of fish that have declined
rapidly in recent decades. 56 Now, with a definition of appurtenances, an
understanding of the purposes behind both maritime liens and fishing
permits, the Court is prepared to arrive at the meat of its argument.
The Court said, "vessels like the Quality One are valuable significantly,
and sometimes almost entirely, because of their permits."' 57 In other words,
a vessel that is barely seaworthy is almost valueless in itself without its
permits. As such, the Court says that "not only the market value but the
creditworthiness of the fishing vessel may well depend on its permits quite
as much as on its engine, physical dimensions, and navigation
152. Id4 at 67.
153. Id. at 68. Citing to the Freights of Mount Shasta case, the Court says, "freight
charges due on account of a vessel's carriage of cargo are to maritime liens against the
vessel." However, as shown in the discussion of the Freights of Mount Shasta, supra section
lI(B)(3), the Supreme Court did not rule that the debt was itself an appurtenance. Instead
the Supreme Court held that the right to payment itself could be the offending res, against
which an action may be brought. See United States v. Freights, Etc., of S/S Mount Shasta,
274 U.S. 466 (1927).
154. Id at 67. Personal property is "any movable or intangible thing that is subject to
ownership and not classified as real property." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNARY 1233 (7th ed.
1999). In real property law, personal property is generally not identified as part of the land
when the land has been used as security, unless it has taken on the characteristics of a fixture.
155. Gowen, Inc. v. FN Quality One, 244 F.3d at 68 (citing Stewart & Stevenson
Services, Inc. v. M/V Chris Way MacMillan, 890 F. Supp. 552,562 (N.D. Miss. 1995). The
Court in Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc. analogizes the question of when something
becomes an appurtenance to "the question of when an article becomes a fixture on real
property." Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc. v. MN Chris Way MacMillan, 890 F. Supp.
552, 562 (1995).
156. Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 244 F.3d at 68.
157. Id.
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equipment."'' 5  Often, with vessels like the Quality One, the only means of
providing value to the vessel is to include the rare and hard-to-obtain
fishing permits that have been assigned to the vessel when securing credit
for the vessel.'59 In other words, if fishing permits are not included as
appurtenances to a marine lien, marine creditors are going to be less likely
to extend credit, and as such, "fishermen seeking repairs and supplies are
likely to benefit from treating a vessel's permits as appurtenances.""lW
After dismantling appellant Nunya's argument that a forthcoming
registration system for fishing permits suggests that fishing permits should
not be treated as appurtenances, 6' the Court affirmed the District Court's
inclusion of fishing permits as appurtenances.'62
158. d
159. Id. The Court says that the Quality One had several permits, a multispecies permit
and several individual permits. See Craig, supra note 88, 32 ENv. L REP. at 10213. Here,
Craig says that "almost all major U.S. fisheries now have some sort of limited access in
recognition of pervasive problems of overcapacity and overcapitalization and their effects
on overfishing." In other words, most U.S. fisheries are closed to newcomers, and most are
based on the "one-out, one-in principle"-limiting the issuance of new permits to the
occasions where another permit is permanently given up. On the issue of how difficult it is
to obtain fishing permits, see discussion supra, and consider that an applicant for a
multispecies permit is eligible only if her vessel meets one of three conditions: the "vessel
must have been issued a limited access multispecies permit for the year before, be replacing
a vessel that was issued a limited access multispecies permit for the preceding year, or be
replacing a vessel that was issued a confirmation of permit history." 50 C.F.R. §
648.4(a)(1)(i) (2002).
160. Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 244F.3dat68-69. The District Court is perhaps
clearer on this point, saying, "[a finding that fishing permits are not appurtenances] could
have a serious impact on those engaged in commercial fishing. If this Court were to hold
that fishing permits are not subject to maritime liens, marine suppliers could become hesitant
to extend what is presumably much-needed credit in the form of goods and services to
commercial fishing vessels, given that the value of such vessels without their permits is far
less." Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587 at *12, n. 6.
161. Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 244 F.3d at 69-70. As owner of the Quality One,
Nunya, Inc. had argued that the registry system (16 U.S.C. § 1855(h)) would provide an
exclusive means of perfection of title for fishing permits, and that the registry system would
effectively preempt the use of maritime liens against fishing permits. But the Court pointed
out that the statutory language was hardly conclusive on the issue, that the registration
system was not yet in place and the statute "tells us nothing about how Congress would wish
the matter to be handled where no registry system yet exists." Id at 70.
162. The District Court's specific holding was that "the Court finds that commercial
fishing permits are appurtenances equivalent to fishing nets and are subject to maritime
liens." Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587 at *11 & *12.
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V. DISCUSSION
There is no question that fishing vessels are often made more valuable
by the inclusion of their fishing permits as appurtenances. However, the
question of whether that added value necessitates the inclusion of fishing
permits as appurtenances is not even addressed in either the District Court's
or the First Circuit's opinion. It is quite a leap from the point that fishing
permits add value to ailing commercial fishing vessels to the conclusion
that, because of that value, fishing permits should be included in every case
of a maritime lien. As has been demonstrated above,"6 a maritime lien
arises every time a vessel obtains services on credit. And as shown, most
federal fishing permits are very difficult to obtain once lost. Fishermen
whose livelihoods depend on having those permits are, as a result of the
Gowen decision, compelled to ostensibly put their livelihoods on the line
every time they obtain services for their vessels on credit. While the First
Circuit claims to have the best interests of the fishermen in mind, the
Gowen decision makes the consequences of the enforcement of a maritime
loan potentially catastrophic for a fisherman who will lose not only a boat,
but a livelihood, and indeed, a way of life, as well.
The First Circuit knew that it was acting in a precedential vacuum as
to whether fishing permits should be included as appurtenances.'" In the
absence of both controlling statutes and case law, the Court could have
come to a different or opposite conclusion with little difficulty, and with
similar legality. As such, the Gowen decision could have been made either
way.165
Both the District Court and the First Circuit panel that decided Gowen
claimed to have the best interests of maritime creditors, fishermen and
fishing communities in mind when they decided that fishing permits are
appurtenances to be included in maritime liens. Both Courts claimed that
if they did not rule the way they did, creditors would be hesitant to extend
credit to fishermen secured only by the rusting hulks of vessels that the
fishermen offer as collateral."6
However, the analysis of both Courts is flawed in at least two respects.
Both the District Court and the First Circuit emphasize the wrong aspects
163. See supra, section H(A) on the nature of a maritime lien.
164. See supra, section MII(B).
165. The decision was not, however, arbitrary and capricious, in that both courts were
not ruling on whims. To the contrary, both courts sought to act within the law. They just
happened to be operating in a legal universe devoid of much precedent.
166. See Gowen, Inc. v. FN Quality One, 244 F.3d 64,68 (1st Cir. 2001); Gowen, Inc.
v. FIN Quality One, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587 at *12, n. 6.
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of the fishing permit regulatory regime, and furthermore, leap to a
conclusion--that fishing permits must be included as appurtenances to
maritime liens-that is not dictated by either law or logic.
A. The Courts' First Flaw
The first flaw is one that affects one of the key premises of the Courts'
argument; namely, that the fishing permit regulatory regime is set up
primarily to conserve the fisheries qua fisheries. In other words, according
to both the District Court and the First Circuit, the fish are being managed
for no other reason than to preserve the ailing fish stocks.'67 The First
Circuit wrote in Gowen that "[blecause of declining fish stocks, federal law
now elaborately regulates catches for many types of fish through a network
of statutory provisions, regulations, and agreements too complicated to
sunmarize."' As the Magnuson-Stevens Act"W clearly maintains,
however, the regulations were put into place not just to preserve the fish
stocks, but to "promote domestic and commercial fishing," as well. 7°
Thus considered, this first "flaw" may not be so much a flaw, but a
telling window into the Courts' reasoning. This differing understanding of
the fishing permit regulatory regime is one that only slightly shifts the
nuances of the argument, but it is a difference that may lead to a different
conclusion. The shift is perhaps only semantic, but it may indicate that
neither the District Court nor the First Circuit had the interests of the
fishing communities at the forefront of their minds. Had the Courts
recognized that the Magnuson-Stevens Act is set up for the conservation of
both the ailing fish stocks and the livelihoods of those who harvest those
fish stocks, they may have been more inclined to see the fishing permits
themselves as intangible items of singular value to the holders of the
permits. As has been demonstrated above, these commercial fishing
permits are not merely replaceable chattel like the vessel's block and tackle
system. To the contrary, the fishing permits are of such value to the
fishermen that they are perhaps better viewed as a commodity entirely
distinct from the vessel. The Gowen Courts' decision fails to recognize that
individual value by requiring fishermen to include their permits as
collateral on every occasion the fishermen need credit for the repair of their
fishing boat.
167. See Gowen, Inc. v. FN Quality One, 244 F.3d at 68.
168 1&
169. See supra, section III(A)(I).
170. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(3) (2001).
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B. The Courts' Second Flaw
The Courts' second flaw can be seen not through an appeal to a
superseding statute, 1 but to logic itself. The First Circuit, after establish-
ing its premises,"2 reaches the intermediate conclusion that "fishermen
seeking repairs and supplies are likely to benefit from treating a vessel's
permits as appurtenances."' 73 This conclusion is, in the large, supported by
the Courts' premises. However, with no further support for the argument,
the holding of the Court leaps to its ultimate conclusion that if the treatment
of fishing permits as appurtenances is beneficial, then such treatment is
necessary.
There are, to be sure, many fishermen who would in fact benefit from
the treatment of fishing permits as appurtenances, in that it would make it
easier to obtain credit needed to finance vessel repairs. These fishermen
would probably have fishing vessels that are not terribly valuable in
themselves-vessels like the Quality One that are "valuable significantly,
and sometimes almost entirely, because of their permits."' 7'
However, consider the case of the fisherman who has a vessel in good
condition, that is quite valuable in and of itself. That fisherman would
presumably be able to obtain the necessary credit by offering only his
vessel (and its traditional appurtenances) as security for the maritime lien.
The Gowen Court's decision, however, requires that fisherman offer not
just the vessel that would have adequately secured the maritime lien, but
also the fishing permits that the fisherman relies on to the same-if not
greater-extent as the vessel itself. That fisherman is clearly not benefitted
by the inclusion of fishing permits as appurtenances to the maritime lien.
C. An Alternative Suggestion
In the absence of authority on the classification of fishing permits, the
First Circuit sought in Gowen to advance the purposes for which maritime
liens were created."7 And at a first reading, the decision does seem to do
exactly that-the inclusion of fishing permits as appurtenances to maritime
liens is likely to "make readily available to a mobile borrower the secured
credit that is often necessary to ensure that a vessel can obtain the basic
171. Such as the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
172. See supra, section IV(B).
173. Gowen, Inc. v. FN Quality One, 244 F.3d at 68-69.
174. lMat 68.
175. 1&
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supplies or services needed for its operation."' 76 However, consider an
alternative suggestion, one that bifurcates the maritime lien into two
distinct parts, or even separate liens: the first, and primary lien would
include the vessel and its traditional appurtenances; and a second lien
would include the vessel's permits. In other words, the second lien would
use the fishing permits themselves as the res of the lien. The first lien
would be used to settle the vessel's debts. Only in the case where the value
of the extended goods or services exceeds that of a vessel would the second
lien be triggered. Thus, in the case where a boat has been extended $1,000
worth of goods or services and the boat is valued at $1,100, the fisherman
would lose his boat, but he would still have his permits. Conversely, if the
boat has been extended $1,100 worth of goods or services and the boat is
valued at $1,000, the creditor would be at liberty to include the fishing
permits in the auction of the boat.
1. The nature of fishing permits under the alternative suggestion
Some may argue that treating the fishing permits as a separate res for
a maritime loan treats fishing permits too much like "property." Fishing
permits are typically seen as "privileges," rather than property.'" However,
this designation of fishing permits as something other than property is
perhaps little more than a handy fiction' 7S-much like the treatment of a
ship as something with a personality of its own. 79 The consequences of the
proposed alternative would do nothing to change the existing understanding
of fishing permits as privileges. Under existing law, fishing permits are
valuable and can be transferred. In fact, the Gowen Court's holding treats
fishing permits as a property-like entity in much the same way as the
176. lit
177. See supra, section IV.
178. This designation allows the government to sidestep thorny Takings Clause (U.S.
CoNST. amend. V) issues that arise when permit holders are subjected to area closures and
catch limitations that were not in place when they were issued their permits. See generally
George J. Mannina, Jr., Is There a Legal and Conservation Basis for Individual Fishing
Quotas?, 3 OcEAN & CoASTAL LJ. 5, 50 (1997) (noting "[a]s courts have long recognized,
something can have value without being private property subject to the Fifth Amendment
if the 'property right' is revoked by the government. The Magnuson-Stevens Act, as
amended by the Sustainable Fisheries Act, confirms this judicial precedent by providing that
an IFQ [a certain form of quota-based commercial fishing permit] is a revocable permit
which does not confer any right to compensation if revoked or limited"); Weiss, supra note
81, at 112 (arguing that the Alaska state legislature "unwittingly" created property when it
allowed fishing permits to be easily transferable even though its explicit intention was to
prevent the treatment of fishing permits as property).
179. See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 40, at 25.
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alternative offered here; for an appurtenance is only useful so long as it
adds value to the security. Furthermore, the newer federal programs that
buy back federal fishing permits from fishermen in an effort to decrease the
size of the fishery also recognize the property-like nature and definite value
of fishing permits."s Finally, the Supreme Court made clear in United
States v. Freights, Etc., of S/S Mount Shasta,8 that intangibles can be
treated as the res of an independent maritime lien. Intangibles such as
fishing permits do not need to be attached to a vessel or anything else to
form the res of a maritime lien. An entity that has value is difficult, if not
impossible, to describe or define without resorting to terms that are used to
describe property, as well. 2
2. What about Article 9?
Article 9 is the principal means by which secured transactions are
regulated."8 3 Article 9 establishes a framework by which debtors can give
creditors an interest in personal property in exchange for the extension of
a loan, goods, or services.' It is natural to think that treatment of fishing
permits under Article 9 would provide a more attractive alternative than
treating fishing permits as appurtenances. However, it is unlikely that
Article 9 would provide a workable solution at this point in time.
Article 9 is a more formalized system than the maritime lien system.
Before a creditor's security agreement is effective against other creditors,
it must be "perfected."' 5  For most personal property, perfection is
achieved with the filing of a financing statement with a state government
office.' As has been discussed, maritime liens arise automatically and
secretly.' Article 9 does provide for automatic perfection in some cases,
180. See Beth Daley, Latest Plan to Reduce N.E. Fishing Fleet Seen Falling Short,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 2003, at B3.
181. United States v. Freights, Etc., of S/S Mount Shasta, 274 U.S. 466 (1927),
discussed supra section lI(B)(3).
182. As Shakespeare's Juliet asked of us all, "[wihat's in a name? that which we call a
rose/By any other name would smell as sweet..." WnjLAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND
JuuEr act H, sc. 2.
183. See generally RUSSELL A. HAKES, THE ABCS OF THE UCC: ARTICI.E 9: SECURED
TRANsACTIONs (1996).
184. Id. at 12; UCC § 9-203 (providing that a security interest attaches to personal
property when (1) the debtor has signed a security interest containing a description of the
collateral, (2) the secured party has given value, and (3) the debtor has rights in the
collateral).
185. HAKES, supra note 183, at 25.
186. Id at 26; UCC § 9-302.
187. See supra, section 1(A).
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and indeed, there is no reason the system could not work for fishing
permits.1
8
It may well be that maritime liens could be included within the purview
of Article 9 or another similar, uniform regime. With the radical advances
in notification technology since the advent of maritime liens, the time for
secret maritime liens, and the other idiosyncratic qualities of the maritime
lien, may have passed with the schooner. The argument for a total
reconsideration of the maritime lien is, however, one for another day. This
Comment proposes a much more modest change to the existing maritime
lien regime, one that could be implemented with a minimum of difficulty,
and a minimum of change to the status quo.
However, other maritime liens are not covered by Article 9, and to
carve out a narrow exception for the lien that covers fishing permits would
be confusing and onerous, as it would subject debtor fishermen and creditor
service providers to all of the various and sundry provisions of Article 9 for
one lien and not for others. Until all maritime liens are covered by Article
9 or some other uniform system, it will be more efficacious to treat the
secondary lien for fishing permits as an ordinary maritime lien.
VI. CONCLUSION
The difference between treating fishing permits as the res of a separate
maritime lien and treating them as appurtenances to maritime liens is more
than a semantic quibble. The consequences of the Gowen Court's holding
on the fishing community may prove to be quite harsh. In a worst case
scenario, fishermen may shirk from obtaining the repairs their vessels need
because they do not wish to put their fishing permits at risk. As they would
be using unsafe fishing gear, the result of such neglect would be an
increased level of physical danger to those fishermen. Much more likely,
however, is the case of a fisherman who does obtain the needed credit with
the inclusion of his fishing permits as an appurtenance to the maritime
lien--and who subsequently has the maritime lien enforced against him,
causing him to lose both his boat and his permits.
As the Gowen Court understood, 18 9 fishing permits are sometimes the
only serious assets that fishermen have. Those permits are assets that, if
lost, can render all other fishing assets entirely worthless to that fisherman.
188. HAKES, supra note 183, at 35. The security interest of a retailer selling consumer
goods on a purchase-money basis is the most common example of automatic perfection. Id.
189. Gowen, Inc. v. FN Quality One, 244 F.3d 64, 68 (lst Cir. 2001) ("[V]essels like
the Quality One are valuable significantly, and sometimes almost entirely, because of their
permits").
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In other words, while a fisherman can lose his boat and replace it, he may
not be able to replace a lost permit. The Gowen Court, recognizing the
value of those permits, assumed that the best thing for the fisherman and
their creditors would be to include the permits in an expanded definition of
what is appurtenant to a maritime lien. But because a permit can be of such
singular value, and because maritime liens can be so readily enforced
against the fisherman, it would be less drastic and perhaps more equitable,
to recognize fishing permits as the res of a separate maritime lien, one that
would only be enforced in the event that the value of the boat itself does not
cover the value of the amount owed. To do anything else unnecessarily
jeopardizes the survival of an already challenged industry.
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